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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Gru¨ndung eines Unternehmens ist eine komplexe Angelegenheit, bei der eine
Vielzahl von Aufgaben erfu¨llt werden muss. Dafu¨r sind eine Reihe unterschied-
licher Qualifikationen erforderlich, die vermutlich nicht von einer Person alleine
erbracht werden ko¨nnen. Es ist daher zu erwarten, dass Unternehmen in Teams
gegru¨ndet werden. Gleichzeitig ist anzunehmen, dass die einzelnen Aufgaben im
Rahmen einer Gru¨ndung in der Weise interdependent sind, dass Fehler bei der
Ausfu¨hrung einer einzigen Aufgabe das gesamte Projekt gefa¨hrden ko¨nnen. Z.B.
ist die beste Produktidee wertlos, wenn es nicht gelingt, genu¨gend Kunden dafu¨r
zu finden. Aus organisationtheoretischer Perspektive ko¨nnen Neugru¨ndungen
damit aus dem Blickwinkel der Organisation von Teamwork in einem Speziali-
stenteam betrachtet werden.
Eine Mo¨glichkeit, die Abha¨ngigkeit des Outputs vom Grad der Erfu¨llung essen-
tieller Aufgaben, die von unterschiedlichen Personen ausgefu¨hrt werden, theore-
tisch zu formalisieren, ist die O-Ring-Produktionsfunktion (Kremer (1993), Fa-
bel (2004)). Die O-Ring-Theorie impliziert, dass sich Teams bilden, in denen
alle Mitglieder das gleiche Fa¨higkeitsniveau haben. Weiterhin sagt die Theorie
voraus, dass die Teams umso gro¨ßer sind und umso mehr Kapital pro Kopf ein-
setzen, je ho¨her das Fa¨higkeitsniveau ihrer Mitglieder ist. In diesem Papier wird
untersucht, inwieweit sich die Implikationen der O-Ring-Theorie in den Daten
wiederfinden lassen. Aus politischer Perspektive ist diese Untersuchung insofern
relevant, als dass die O-Ring-Theorie als Grundlage fu¨r Handlungsanweisungen
zur Fo¨rderung junger Unternehmen dienen kann.
Fu¨r die Analyse steht ein umfangreicher Datensatz zur Verfu¨gung, der sa¨mtliche
Unternehmen, die 1998 in Da¨nemark gegru¨ndet wurden, sowie alle in diesen Un-
ternehmen bescha¨ftigten Individuen umfasst. Um zu bestimmen, wie stark sich
die Individuen zur Gru¨ndung eines Unternehmens hinsichtlich ihrer Fa¨higkeiten
segregieren, werden statistische Tests konstruiert, die die tatsa¨chlich beobach-
tete Aufteilung mit einer zufa¨lligen Aufteilung der Individuen auf die Unterneh-
men vergleichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich, entgegen den Vorhersagen der
O-Ring-Theorie, eher Individuen mit unterschiedlichem Fa¨higkeitsniveau zusam-
menfinden. Weiterhin gru¨nden fa¨higere Leute eher kleinere Unternehmen. Als
einzige korrekte Vorhersage erweist sich der positive Zusammenhang zwischen
Fa¨higkeitsniveau und Kapital pro Kopf. Insgesamt erscheint die O-Ring-Theorie
damit als keine gute Beschreibung junger Unternehmen.
Non-Technical Summary
Setting up a new firm is a complex process, which comprises many tasks. These
different tasks require different qualifications. It can be expected that the required
qualifications are provided by different persons, since one person alone cannot
possess all relevant skills. Presumably, new firms are therefore founded in teams.
Further, it can be assumed that the different tasks, which are to be performed
in the course of establishing a firm, are interdependent in a way that a failure in
the performance of a single task can put the whole project at risk. For example,
the best business idea is not worth anything if it is not marketed appropriately
to potential consumers. Thus, from the perspective of organisation theory, the
establishment of a firm is an example of organising team work in a team of
specialists.
A way to formalise the idea of direct impact of the degree of task performance on
output is the O-ring production framework (Kremer (1993), Fabel (2004)). The
O-ring theory implies the segregation of individuals between firms according to
their level of ability. Furthermore, the O-ring approach predicts that firm size
and capital per head should increase with employees’ average level of ability. In
this paper it is analysed to what extent the predictions of the O-ring theory are
supported by the data. This study is also relevant from a policy perspective, as
the O-ring theory can serve as a basis for guidelines to assist new firms.
For the analysis, a rich register data set is used covering the whole population
of firms founded in Denmark in 1998, as well as all individuals involved in these
new firms in the start-up year and in the following three years. In order to
analyse the extent of sorting of individuals between firms, statistical tests are
constructed, which compare the actual distribution of individuals among firms
with the distribution resulting from random assignment of individuals to firms.
The results show that, contrary to the predictions of the theory, individuals with
different levels of ability are more inclined to team up in new firms. Also contrary
to the predictions of the theory, firm size and average level of ability of the
involved individuals turn out to be negatively correlated. The only relationship
that is predicted correctly by the theory is the positive relationship between
capital per head and the average level of ability. In summary, the O-ring theory
apparently does not provide a good description for the situation of young firms.
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Abstract
In this paper I analyse how individuals match for for the purpose of
setting up a new firm. As a theoretical basis I use the O-ring theory intro-
duced by Kremer (1993) and applied to new firms by Fabel (2004). The
O-ring theory predicts that individuals segregate between firms according
to their level of ability. Further, the theory implies that a higher average
ability level within firms is positively related to both the number of individ-
uals and capital per head. Using a rich employer-employee data set on the
whole population of Danish firms founded in 1998 most of the predictions
of the O-ring theory are rejected. I find that individuals do not match
with individuals with the same level of ability. Furthermore, ability and
firm size turn out to be negatively correlated. There is only some support
for the hypothesis concerning the positive relationship between ability and
capital per head.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, O-Ring Theory, Theory Test
JEL Classification: D23, L26, M13.
∗Bettina.Mueller@zew.de. ZEW Mannheim, Centre for European Economic Research, Re-
search Group Information and Communication Technologies, P.O.Box 103443, D-68034 Mann-
heim, Germany. The author is thankful to Irene Bertschek, Katrin Schleife, Thorsten Doherr,
and Oliver Fabel for many helpful advices. Special thanks go to Statistics Denmark and the
Centre for Economic and Business Research in Copenhagen, DK, for providing me with access
to the data as well as to Stefan Boeters for many extensive and helpful discussions. Financial
support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through the research group “Hetero-
geneous Labor: Positive and Normative Aspects of the Skill Structure of Labor¨ıs gratefully
acknowledged. Comments are very welcome.
1 Introduction
New firms are regarded to be of substantial relevance for the development of an
economy, especially for innovation, growth, and the creation of jobs. But setting
up a new firm is a complex process which comprises many tasks. This especially
applies for new firms in research- and knowledge-intensive sectors since in addition
to the challenge of setting up a new firm in general there is often an innovation
− either a new product, a new service, or a new production technology − at the
heart of the new business. It can be expected that complexity requires different
qualifications provided by different persons, since one person alone presumably
cannot possess all relevant skills. Accordingly, authors like Fabel (2004) assume
that it is necessary to have a team composed of specialists to establish a new
firm. However, this requirement might also give rise to a particular sort of risk:
If all team members are specialists in different areas, a specific task cannot be
taken over by other team members in case one of the team members makes a
mistake. If the performance of a team member assigned to an essential task is
below a critical level therefore the whole project is at risk. Thus, together with
fulfilling the requirement of different qualifications, the risk of failure due to the
malperformance of certain tasks by one or more team members must be coped
with and the choice of appropriate partners is essential for new firms.
A way to formalise this idea of direct impact of the degree of task performance
on output is the O-ring production framework which was introduced by Kremer
(1993) and applied to new firms by Fabel (2004). The O-ring production function
conceptualises the production process as a set of tasks with complementarity
in the ability levels of the persons performing these tasks. Complementarity in
ability means that the replacement of a person by some other person with slightly
higher ability level not only increases the marginal product of the whole project,
but the more so the higher the average ability of the other persons involved in
the project. The O-ring theory implies segregation of individuals between firms
according to their level of ability. Furthermore, the O-ring approach predicts that
firm size should increase with the average ability level of the employees and that
more capital per head should be employed the higher the average ability level of
the employees.
In this paper I analyse to what extent the predictions of the O-ring theory are
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supported by the data. From a policy perspective the results of this analysis
allow to learn more about how to set up networking forums or incubator organi-
sations like technology parks, spin-off centers at universities, or study programs
which aim at endowing individuals interested in setting up a firm with relevant
skills. Besides providing infrastructure and financial support these institutions
also give individuals the opportunity to observe each other’s abilities and thus to
reduce the asymmetric information with respect to the characteristics of poten-
tial partners. If the O-ring theory turns out to provide a reasonable description
of the matching of individuals for setting up a new firm, incubators should aim
at bringing together persons with the same level of ability. Further, the O-ring
theory can be used to derive welfare statements as Fabel and Weber (2005) do.1
For my investigation, I use Danish register data covering the whole population of
firms founded in 1998 as well as all individuals involved in these new firms in the
start-up year and in the following three years. The data provide rich information
on the individual side so that it can be determined which characteristics are ex-
hibited by persons who match for setting up a new firm. Special attention is given
to firms founded with university graduates since these firms can be expected to
have the highest potential of introducing innovative products (Koellinger (2008)),
the production of which presumably require knowledge from different fields. For
these firms a good matching of individuals might be especially important.
In order to analyse the degree of sorting of individuals between firms, statistical
tests are constructed, which compare the actual distribution of individuals among
firms with the distribution resulting from random assignment of individuals to
firms. The results show that individuals more often choose partners with an
equal educational background than could be expected from random assignment.
Concerning ability, there is rather evidence against the conjecture that individuals
search systematically for other individuals with the same level of ability. Also
contrary to the predictions of the theory, firm size and average ability of the
involved individuals turn out to be negatively correlated. Capital per head and
ability level are positively related in most of the industries as predicted.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the implications of the O-ring
theory are worked out in detail. In Section 3 I check how far existing results can
1Fabel and Weber (2005) show on the basis of the O-ring theory, that the welfare effects of
incubators depend on the degree of risk aversion in an economy.
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be interpreted as evidence in favour of the O-ring theory. Section 4 describes the
data. In Section 5 the results are presented. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The O-ring approach got its name from the accident of the space shuttle Chal-
lenger, which exploded in 1986 because of the malfunctioning of only one of its
components: the O-rings of the booster. This event is an extreme example of
production processes which consist of a series of tasks, each of which must be ful-
filled at a certain minimum level of quality for the output to have positive market
value. For new firms this seems to be an appropriate description of their situation
since the whole project can fail if only one task is not performed carefully. For
example, the best idea is not worth anything if it is not marketed appropriately
to potential costumers. In the following, the O-ring approach is outlined and its
empirical implications are worked out.
In the O-ring framework the above outlined idea of ability interdependence is
expressed by the following function of expected production:
Y = F (k, n)
[
n∏
i=1
qi
]
n, (1)
where k refers to physical capital, n to the number of tasks and qi ∈ (0, 1) to the
ability of the individual assigned to task i. Ability is measured by the probability
of perfect task performance: If one of the individuals makes a mistake, which
happens with the probability 1− [∏ni=1 qi], output is zero.
New firms can be assumed to maximise surplus per team member (Fabel (2004)),
so that their objective function can be written as:
max
{qi},k,n
pF (k, n) [
∏n
i=1 qi]n− rk
n
= max
q,k,n
p
Y
n
− rk
n
, (2)
where p refers to the output price and r to the interest rate. In the literature,
for reasons of simplicity, it is usually assumed that each task requires only one
worker, i.e. n is also interpreted as the number of individuals. This assumption is
debatable since it might be worthwhile to back up critical tasks by several persons
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or to have one person to execute several tasks. Additionally, if taken literally this
would imply that there is only one task to be accomplished in the firm if we
observe a single entrepreneur. This is obviously nonsense.2 In the following, the
assumption is maintained, but it is tried to conjecture from the data whether task
allocation is accomplished in the assumed way.3 The reasoning is the following:
If individuals have different educations they acquire different knowledge which
makes them predestined for certain tasks but not for others. Thus, when several
persons are involved in a start-up, it can be expected to observe that different
individuals have different educations.4 Therefore, the first hypothesis analysed
in this paper is:
H1: If the firm is founded by a team, team members match systematically so that
different team members have different educations.
The O-ring production function exhibits the property that the marginal product
of the ability level of the individual assigned to task i, qi is positively related to
the average ability level of the individuals assigned to the other tasks:
d2Y
dqid
(∏
j 6=i qj
) = F (k, n)n > 0. (3)
This also holds for output per head Y/n and means that abilities are comple-
mentary.5 It implies that firms which have started to employ individuals with
the highest ability in the population can attract other individuals of the highest
ability level since they can pay the highest wage for them. Firms with medium
ability individuals in the first n− 1 tasks cannot successfully compete for higher
quality individuals but are successful in attracting medium ability individuals
compared to firms with lower average ability level. If (and only if) labour mar-
kets are competitive this leads to the result that individuals within a firm are
homogeneous with respect to their ability.6 (Formally, this means that [
∏n
i=1 qi]
can be replaced by qn). Accordingly, the second hypothesis is:
2In his seminal paper Kremer (1993) explicitly mentions that n indicates the number of
tasks, and not necessarily the number of employees. But his exposition of the theory uses the
assumption of one person per task and e.g. Fabel (2004) follows him in this respect.
3Assignment of individuals to tasks is not reported in the data.
4Firms set up with more than one person are referred to as team foundations in the following.
5This is the same concept of complementarity as in Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995).
6Prat (2002) shows that complementarity is a sufficient condition for firms having a homo-
geneous workforce is optimal.
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H2: If the firm is founded by a team, team members match systematically so that
the different team members have the same level of ability.
For the following, a specific functional form for F (k, n) is needed. Normalising
output price p to one and specifying output per team member F (k, n) as kαn(1−α)
as in Fabel (2004) the first order conditions of the optimisation problem given in
equation (2) with respect to n and k are:
(1− α)kαn−αqn + kαn(1−α)qnlog(q) + rk
n2
= 0 (4)
and
αk(α−1)n(1−α)qn − r
n
= 0 (5)
Solving for n and k/n yields the optimal values for the number of employees n∗
and for capital per head k∗/n∗:
1
n∗
= −log(q) (6)
and
k∗
n∗
=
(
αqn
∗
r
) 1
1−α
(n∗)
1
1−α (7)
From equation (6) we get:
H3: Given that each tasks requires one person, team size and ability level are
positively correlated.
Note from equation (6) that a firm is founded by a team only when the average
ability level is at least 0.607. Dependent on the distribution of ability in the
population, the probability to actually observe team foundations might therefore
be rather low. For example, assuming that q is distributed uniformly, as done by
Fabel (2004), the ability level for a team foundation has to be above average.
The fourth hypothesis is based on equation (7):
H4: The higher the ability level, the more capital per head is deployed.
Intuitively, more able workers have a lower probability of failing why the risk that
they destroy valuable capital goods is rather low.
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One of the challenges of the empirical analysis is to find an appropriate measure
for ability, since the probability to fail while performing a task is usually not
reported. However, the O-ring theory suggests to use wages as a representation
of ability. To see this, consider a firm that maximises expected profit:
max
q,k,n
pi(q, k, n) = F (k, n)qn − w(q)− rk (8)
Here, the implied sorting of individuals is already exploited and [
∏n
i=1 qi] replaced
by qn. This firm will not want to change the ability level of its employees anymore
if:
F (k, n)q(n−1)n =
dw(q)
dq
, (9)
i.e. if marginal revenue of changing the ability level equals marginal costs. Inte-
gration and insertion of kαn(1−α) yields:
w∗(q) = (1− α)
(
α
r
) α
1−α − (n∗) 11−α q n∗1−α . (10)
Thus, the optimal wage is a monotonously increasing function of ability. In the
empirical analysis wages are therefore used as a measure for ability.
3 Related Literature
There are some papers providing facts which are in line with the predictions of
the O-ring theory, although they do not aim at directly testing the theory. In the
following, these papers are presented and related to the predictions of the O-ring
theory.
3.1 Sorting of individuals according to ability
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) as well as Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske
(2004) examine the development of the wage dispersion in US manufacturing
firms in the years 1963 to 1986 and 1975 to 1992 respectively. Interpreting wages
as a reflection of abilities, their framework also provides an indication how the
sorting of workers according to their abilities has evolved over time. By means of a
variance decomposition they divide the total variation in wages into the variation
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within plants and the variation between plants. A larger between- than within-
plant component can be taken as an indication that workers are sorted between
firms. The authors find that the between-plant component accounts for more
than 50 percent of the total variance in each of the considered years. Additionally,
they find that a considerable part of the increase in the wage dispersion can be
attributed to an increase in the variation of wages between plants.
However, as Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) argue, using raw wages as a
measure of ability might give misleading results concerning the segregation of
workers by ability. The reason is that raw wages also include firm-specific effects
which can be due to different compensation policies, such as efficiency wages
and rent sharing, which do not reflect individual ability (Kramarz, Lollivier,
and Pele` (1996)). Not correcting the wages for these firm-specific components
might lead to greater between-firm variation of wages which has no analogy in
a greater between-firm variation of ability. In fact, as Iranzo et al. (2008) show
for the Italian manufacturing sector, the between-plant component is by some
10 percentage points higher when raw wages are used instead of wages corrected
for firm fixed effects. Using corrected wages, they find that the between-plant
component is rather low.7 For all workers it fluctuates around 17 percent of
total variation over the period 1982 to 1996. For nonproduction workers it is
even lower, around 8 percent for the same time period. Moreover, there is no
tendency of an increase in segregation over time detectable.
There are also efforts to determine the segregation of skills on the basis of ob-
servable skill characteristics other than wages. Kramarz et al. (1996) show seg-
regation indices which are defined as the fraction of the between-plant variation
in total variation of the share of unskilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar
workers, foremen, clerks, technicians as well as of engineers, professionals, or
managers in the years 1986 and 1992 for France. The fraction of the between-
plant component for all these groups has risen between the considered years, so
that members of the different groups work together more often in the same firm.
The same tendency is reported by Kremer and Maskin (1996) for similar worker
groups as considered by Kramarz et al. (1996) in Great Britain in the years
1984 and 1990. Thus, there are some hints that individuals increasingly sort
7Iranzo et al. (2008) also correct the wages for individual time variant effects like age and
seniority. This is disputable since these effects can also be considered as ability components.
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themselves into firms according to their ability.
3.2 Relationship between ability and firm size
Concerning H3 it is a well documented fact that large firms pay higher wages (e.g.
Mellow (1982), Oi (1983), Brown and Medoff (1989), and Troske (1999)). Brown
and Medoff (1989), for example, report that on average employees working in
firms with log employment being one standard deviation above average get 6 to 15
percent higher wages than similar workers in firms with log employment being one
standard deviation below average, depending on the data set. Similarly, Troske
(1999) estimates that workers in firms with log employment being one standard
deviation above average get 13 respectively 11 percent more than workers in firms
with log employment being one standard deviation below average, depending on
whether plant or firm size is considered.
There has been considerable discussion about the question why workers in larger
firms get higher wages since these differences even appear after controlling for
observable worker and firm characteristics. However, as Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999) show, the by far biggest fraction of the employer size-wage effect
can be explained by a pure person effect, which is the workers’ ability net of
observable individual and firm characteristics. Additionally, Abowd et al. (1999)
find that the higher the average levels of the observable skill characteristics as well
as the average level of pure ability the larger is the firm in terms of employees.
Thus, it can be inferred that it is higher ability that leads to higher wages for in-
dividuals working in larger firms, which corresponds to the prediction formulated
in H3.
3.3 Relationship between ability and capital employment
Abowd et al. (1999) also provide evidence that ability and capital employment
are positively related, which is formulated in H4 above. The average levels of
observable skill characteristics as well as the average level of pure ability come
along with higher total capital employment as well as with higher capital input
per head.
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In summary, there are several facts that are consistent with the predictions of the
O-ring theory. However, doubts can be put forward whether the O-ring theory
explains the observed facts as all studies are conducted on rather large firms, for
which it is not reasonable to assume that each task is critical in the sense of the
O-ring theory. Additionally, the studies were not undertaken to explicitly test
the O-ring theory. An exception is the recently released working paper by Yu and
Orazem (2008). The authors actually find that skills leading to higher wages are
also positively correlated with firm size and technological complexity.8 However,
they cannot determine which individuals work together in firms, which is at the
heart of the O-ring theory.
In the following it is pursuit whether the O-ring theory is a good description for
the situation of young firms.
4 Data
The data used in this paper are provided by Statistics Denmark, Denmark’s
federal statistical office. At the end of 1998 Statistics Denmark took stock of all
new firms which had been set up in Denmark. On an annual basis, these firms
were followed until 2001 or until they shut down.9 The data are register data,
which cover the whole population of firms that were set up in 1998 and that were
still in operation at the end of that year. Firms that had started in 1998 and
shut down within the same year are not contained in the data set. Firm-level
information collected in the start-up year comprises industry of business, legal
form, location, total number of employees, total annual exports, total annual
purchases, and total annual sales. At the end of each year during the follow-
up period, the current number of employees and the current amount of exports,
purchases, and sales are recorded.
8Yu and Orazem (2008) interpret the O-ring theory differently than it is done in this paper.
They equate n with the number of technologies used and take output Y as a measure of size.
9The same procedure has been applied to all firms founded in 1994. However, for these firms
it is only possible to merge individual information for the person who registered the firm with
the authorities for the start-up year. Since for determining the degree of homogeneity between
team members it is essential to either have information on all individuals or to have at least a
representative sample of the individuals the analysis is restricted to the 1998 cohort.
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Via a combination of a firm and a personal identification number (ID) it is possi-
ble to link the firm-level information to information on individuals stored in the
Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA). The IDA database cov-
ers a wide range of variables on the total Danish population from 1980 onwards,
especially the whole education and employment history. These can be used to
generate the relevant variables for the individuals involved in the new firms in the
start-up year. Additionally, it is possible to identify those who join the firms in
the years right after foundation and therefore to look at the development of the
workforce characteristics over time. The individual information exploited in the
following analysis comprises the highest level of education attained, wages, labour
market experience, unemployment spells, prior self-employment experience, and
leadership experience.
A drawback of the data is that it is not possible to distinguish between persons
who are in fact founders of the respective firm and persons who are solely em-
ployees. It is only known which person registered the firm with the authorities.
However, as the great majority of the new firms are small entities – 80 percent
have five or less persons and the modus is one person – the characteristics of each
person might be important regardless of whether the person is a founder or not.10
The data are adjusted in two respects. First, in some cases the person who regis-
tered the firm with the authorities has been included in the number of employees
by Statistic Denmark but in others it has not. To correct this, the number of
employees raised by Statistics Denmark is increased by one in case the registering
person was not counted as an employee. This needs to be done since otherwise
some firms would not have had any employees. Second, for some firms not all em-
ployees can be identified, i.e. the number of employees recorded in the respective
variable in the firm data is greater than the number of personal IDs that can be
merged to the firm data. Firms for which either no personal ID can be matched
at all, which lack all personal IDs for the start-up year, or for which personal
IDs can only be merged with gaps (e.g. all individuals both in 1998 and 2000
are identified but not in 1999) are removed from the data set. In the case where
the number of employees recorded differs from the number of personal IDs that
10Figure 3 in the appendix shows the average number of individuals over the whole period of
consideration. The average firm size is 1.7 individuals. With 1.9 persons firms with university
graduates are slightly larger than firms without university graduates (1.6 persons). Manufac-
turing firms are bigger than firms in the service sectors.
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can be merged for each year without gaps, the number of personal IDs is used
instead of the number of employees recorded. From the 16,063 firms founded in
1998, 14,171 are used for the subsequent analyses.
The O-ring theory is formulated for production environments in which tasks are
complementary. This certainly applies for some industries to a greater extent
than for others. Since it is not clear in advance for which industries the O-
ring production function is most appropriate, the sample is split up into twelve
industries and the results are separately presented for each industry.11 Likewise,
it might be the case that firms founded with university graduates are better
described by the O-ring theory than firms founded without university graduates.
The reason is that these firms are more likely to deal with innovative products
and therefore with more complex technologies which require specialists in different
fields. Good matching might therefore be especially important for these firms.
The analyses concerning H1 and H2 only apply to firms which are founded by
teams. Figure 1 shows the proportion of firms that are founded with at least
two persons by industry, separately for all firms, for firms with university gradu-
ates, and for firms without university graduates. To determine whether there are
significant differences in the fraction of team foundations between firms with uni-
versity graduates and firms without university graduates a t-test on the equality
of means is performed. It turns out that only 11 percent of all firms have more
than one employee at the end of the start-up year. In general, the need for sev-
eral persons is higher in manufacturing than in services. The sectors with the
three highest proportions of team foundations are hotels, restaurants (33 per-
cent), high technology (18 percent), and construction work (18 percent). This
rank order holds also for firms founded with university graduates. Among the
firms founded without university graduates construction work ranks second (17
percent) followed by medium-low technology (16 percent). Comparing the two
groups it turns out that firms founded with university graduates are in total not
significantly more often set up by teams than firms founded without university
graduates. Considering the sectors separately, firms with university graduates are
more often set up by teams in hotels, restaurants, construction work, wholesale
trade, freight transport, knowledge-intensive market services, and knowledge-
intensive high-tech services.
11For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 8 in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Fraction of firms founded by a team
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market services*
freight transport*
retail trade, repair
wholesale trade*
medium-high
technology
low technology
medium-low
technology
construction work*
high technology
hotels, restaurants*
fraction of firms in percent
all firms
firms with univ. graduates
firms w/o univ. graduates
Reading aid: 42.86 percent of the firms in the sector hotels, restaurants founded with university graduates are
set up with at least two persons.
Notes: Total number of firms: 14,171. Number of firms with university graduates: 2,543. Number of firms
without university graduates: 11,095. The difference in the sum of the firms with university graduates and
without university graduates is due to missing values in the education variable.
A * at the sector names indicates whether firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without
university graduates at the 5% level.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
5 Methods and Results
The presentation of results below follows the order of the hypotheses derived in
Section 2. First, the results on the heterogeneity of educations are shown, then
those regarding the degree of homogeneity with respect to ability, and finally
the results referring to the relation between the ability level within firms and
team size as well as capital input. Section 5.1 to 5.5 refer to the situation in
the start-up year. In Section 5.6 the development over time of the heterogeneity
of educations, the degree of homogeneity with respect to ability as well as of
the relation between ability and firm size is examined. The methods applied are
described in the course of the presentation of the results.
5.1 Heterogeneity of educations
H1 states that each person of a founding team has attained a different education.
To determine the degree of heterogeneity the Herfindahl-Index of the highest
education attained is calculated for each team foundation. The Herfindahl-Index
is a measure of concentration. For the present case it is computed as the sum of
the squared shares of the different educations:
H =
n∑
i=1
s2i , (11)
where si denotes the share of education i.
The underlying education variable could take on more than 1,000 values, i.e.
provides highly detailed information on the educational background of the in-
dividuals. Since the discipline of the highest educational attainment is only a
crude measure for the task actually fulfilled in the firm – it is both possible that
one education enables for several tasks and that one and the same task can be
conducted by persons with different educational background – no obvious level of
aggregation for this variable exists. Therefore, the variable was not aggregated
in any respect for calculating the Herfindahl-Index. Besides, if it turns out that
even with such a high number of possible values the Herfindahl-Index does not
take the lowest possible value for all firms, the results are of highly informative
value.
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There are two important points to note. First, the range of the values of the
Herfindahl-Index depends on the number of individuals in the team. For example:
If there are two persons the Herfindahl-Index can take on the values 1 and 1
2
, in
the case of three persons 1, 5
9
and 1
3
etc. This entails the question of how to
compare Herfindahl-Indices of teams of different size. One possibility is to only
consider the number of different educations within a firm. In this case, e.g. a team
consisting of two persons who have different educations is regarded as diverse as
a team consisting of four persons in which two at a time have the same education.
Comparing teams of different size this way is just to take the Herfindahl-Index as
defined in equation (11). A second possibility is to treat teams as equally diverse
if all individuals have different educations regardless of team size. This can be
achieved by transforming the Herfindahl-Index in the following way:
H tr =
(
H − 1
n
)
n
n− 1 ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
As a result, the Herfindahl-Index takes the value one if all individuals have the
same education and becomes zero if each individual attained a different education.
I opted for the transformed index. However, the transformation is not necessary
for the following analyses. It is just a matter of defining what is meant by “equally
diverse”. Referring to H1, the value of the Herfindahl-Index in equation (12) is
expected to be zero for all firms, i.e. the individuals within a firm differ from
each other with regard to their educations.
The second point to note is that the values of the Herfindahl-Index per se do
not provide a means to test H1. The reason is that there is no natural reference
level providing a basis to decide whether the diversity in educations is low, high
or on an average level. To make such a judgement possible a statistical test
is constructed where the values of the Herfindahl-Index actually observed are
compared with the values of the Herfindahl-Index received in a situation where
individuals match randomly. The null hypothesis of the test is:
H10 : The composition of the actual observed teams with respect to disciplines
equals a random selection of individuals.
To perform the test, mean and variance of the Herfindahl-Index under random
assignment (H trrandom) have to be determined. However, both values can only be
derived analytically for a given team size. Therefore the distribution of H trrandom
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is simulated. The procedure is as follows: All individuals of a given sector are
taken and randomly assigned to firms, maintaining the actually observed size
distribution of firms. After that the Herfindahl-Index per firm is calculated and
averaged on the industry level. The resulting value is then stored. The procedure
is carried out 1,000 times in total. From the resulting distribution the lower and
upper 0.5, 2.5 and 5 percentiles are determined and then chosen as critical values
for the decision whether H tractual and H
tr
random differ significantly at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
Table 1 shows the actual average (transformed) Herfindahl-Index per industry for
all firms (column (1)) as well as for firms with university graduates (column (3))
and firms without university graduates (column (5)) respectively.12 The mean
value of the distribution of the average Herfindahl-Index with random assignment
of individuals to firms is given in columns (2), (4), and (6). In most cases the ac-
tual Herfindahl-Index is rather close to zero but not exactly zero. And, in almost
all industries the value of the average Herfindahl-Index with random assignment
of individuals to firms is even smaller than the actual average Herfindahl-Index.
Additionally, the difference between the two values is significant in many cases.13
Thus, it can be concluded that individuals apparently look systematically for
their teammates, but tend to choose partners with similar educations. H1 is
therefore rejected.
A possible explanation for the results is that individuals simply do not know
persons from other fields. An engineer is much more likely to know other engi-
neers than, say, a person with a business education because they usually have a
closer contact especially during their studies. Personal contacts are probably the
most common way how individuals come together for a firm foundation. Formal
job advertisements (“Wanted: Partner for establishing a firm”) are usually not
observed.
12Because there are only around ten percent team foundations, as shown in Figure 1, and
the firms are unevenly distributed over industries, some numbers are based on only a few firms.
E.g. the average Herfindahl-Index of all firms in the high technology sector is based on six firms
and the one for firms with university graduates in the sector medium-high technology on only
two firms.
13Table 9 in the appendix shows the 95%- confidence intervals for the average Herfindahl-
Indices. The distributions are not symmetric. Therefore, the mean values in Table 1 do not lie
in the middle of the interval.
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Table 1: Heterogeneity of educations in start-up year
industry all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
observed with
random
assignm.
observed with
random
assignm.
observed with
random
assignm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total (firms with n > 1) 0.131*** 0.049 0.084*** 0.023 0.145*** 0.057
manufacturing
low-technology 0.143*** 0.077 0.103** 0.054 0.164*** 0.082
medium-low technology 0.088* 0.047 0.065* 0.033 0.092 0.051
medium-high technology 0.086 0.039 0.033 0.025 0.098 0.046
high technology 0.099 0.055 0.063 0.040 0.148 0.064
construction work 0.223*** 0.061 0.199*** 0.031 0.228*** 0.064
services
wholesale trade 0.125*** 0.033 0.027 0.015 0.150*** 0.038
retail trade, repair 0.107*** 0.049 0.045** 0.024 0.116*** 0.052
hotels, restaurants 0.103*** 0.060 0.039 0.034 0.110*** 0.064
freight transport 0.082** 0.046 0.044 0.026 0.090** 0.050
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.112*** 0.032 0.068*** 0.018 0.169** 0.063
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.128*** 0.028 0.120*** 0.018 0.137*** 0.047
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.033 0.021 0.000 0.013 0.050 0.026
Notes: The diversity of educations is measured by the Herfindahl-Index of highest educational attainment.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the average Herfindahl-Index by industry based on the actual sorting of individuals
to firms. Columns (2), (4) and (6) depict the mean value of the distribution of the average Herfindahl-Index by
industry generated with random assignment of individuals to firms.
**, **, * indicate whether the values in column (1), (3) and (5) are significantly different from the values in
column (2), (4) and (6) at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
5.2 Degree of homogeneity with respect to abilities
As formulated in H2, the O-ring theory implies that individuals working in the
same firm have the same level of ability. The O-ring framework also implies that
wages can be used to measure abilities empirically. The degree of homogeneity of
abilities between individuals in a firm is therefore determined by calculating the
standard deviation of individual wages. Statistics Denmark provides the average
hourly wage once a year for each year the individual was wage employed. For this
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paper the average hourly wages are corrected for inflation, disciplines and industry
effects. Then the average lifetime hourly wage of an individual starting from the
year of labour market entry until 2001 is calculated. Correcting the wages that
way aims at excluding all components which do not represent ability.14
As in Section 5.1, where a reference for the Herfindahl-Index had to be found, a
reference value for the standard deviation of wages has to be chosen. From the
theoretical perspective the standard deviation has to be zero since all individuals
within a firm have the same ability and therefore the same wages. Zero, however,
cannot be used to formulate the null hypothesis of a statistical test since this
hypothesis would be rejected with probability one.15 In order to get a reference
point how good the observed standard deviation meets the theoretical value of
zero a similar procedure as in Section 5.1 is applied: The actual standard devi-
ation is compared with the standard deviation in a situation where individuals
match randomly. Then it is tested whether these two values differ significantly.
The null hypothesis in this case is:
H20 : The composition of the actual observed teams with respect to abilities equals
a random selection of individuals.
The distribution of the standard deviation in the case of random matching is
simulated again since mean and standard deviation can only be derived analyti-
cally for a given team size. The simulation method is the same as in Section 5.1:
Individuals are randomly assigned to firms, then the standard deviation of the
wages per firm is calculated and averaged on the industry level. The resulting
values are stored. This is done 1,000 times.
The results are presented in Table 2. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the actual
standard deviation for all firms, firms with university graduates and firms without
university graduates respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show the mean value
14The effects of disciplines and industries were corrected in order to take out demand effects.
If, for example, engineers are in short supply their wages go up due to the working of the market
forces and not predominantly due to an increase in their abilities. A further discussion of the
procedure for correcting the wages is given in Section 5.5.
15The distribution of the standard deviation of wages is a one point mass distribution under
the null hypothesis since the standard deviation cannot take on values below zero. Standard
deviations greater than zero are impossible to observe under this null hypothesis.
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Table 2: Homogeneity of abilities in start-up year
industry all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
observed with
random
assignm.
observed with
random
assignm.
observed with
random
assignm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total (firms with n > 1) 0.276*** 0.308 0.300** 0.315 0.266*** 0.306
manufacturing
low-technology 0.292* 0.319 0.260*** 0.330 0.304 0.316
medium-low technology 0.261** 0.305 0.284 0.321 0.255* 0.301
medium-high technology 0.236** 0.298 0.260 0.291 0.230* 0.301
high technology 0.438 0.442 0.534 0.453 0.309 0.436
construction work 0.236*** 0.277 0.253 0.276 0.232*** 0.278
services
wholesale trade 0.319 0.321 0.340 0.322 0.312 0.320
retail trade, repair 0.262*** 0.290 0.275 0.294 0.258*** 0.290
hotels, restaurants 0.291*** 0.328 0.338 0.334 0.279*** 0.327
freight transport 0.291*** 0.343 0.343 0.363 0.264*** 0.339
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.283 0.300 0.279 0.293 0.287 0.316
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.288*** 0.318 0.292** 0.322 0.283 0.311
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.305 0.334 0.351 0.338 0.282 0.332
Notes: Ability is measured by the average lifetime wage (in logs) of an individual corrected for inflation,
disciplines and industry. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the average standard deviation of ability by industry
based on the actual sorting of individuals to firms. Columns (2), (4) and (6) depict the mean value of the
distribution of the average standard deviation by industry generated with random assignment of individuals to
firms.
**, **, * indicate whether the values in column (1), (3) and (5) are significantly different from the values in
column (2), (4) and (6) at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
of the distribution of the average standard deviation which results from randomly
assigning individuals to firms. Considering all firms and firms without university
graduates, the actual standard deviation of the wages lies below the one resulting
from randomly assigning individuals to firms. The difference between the two
values is significant in more than half of the cases.16 That is, more often than
16The 95%-confidence intervals of the standard deviation of log wages are given in Table 10
in the appendix. Again, the distributions are not symmetric. Thus, the mean value given in
Table 2 does not lie in the middle of the interval.
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it could have been expected in a situation of random matching, individuals tend
to match according to their abilities. H2 cannot be rejected for these firms.
However, the situation is different for firms founded with university graduates.
Firms of this subgroup in high-technology, wholesale trade and other knowledge-
intensive services exhibit a higher actual standard deviation of wages than under
random assignment. The difference is not significant, though. Thus, firms with
university graduates do not systematically look for partners with the same level
of ability and H2 can be rejected for this subgroup in most of the industries.
5.3 Relationship between ability and start-up size
The low fraction of team foundations observed (Figure 1) is not necessarily evi-
dence against the O-ring theory, as explained in Section 2. It could be the case
that the ability of the individuals is below the critical value necessary for a team
foundation. Evidence against the theory can be established if H3 can be rejected,
i.e. if start-up size and ability are either not correlated at all or negatively cor-
related.
In order to test H3, the equations of the O-ring model can be used. Remember
that the (equilibrium) equation for the relationship between team size n and
ability q is:
1
n∗
= −log(q)⇔ n∗log(q) = −1. (13)
Since ability q is not observed this equation cannot directly be employed. But
log(q) can be expressed in terms of wages. Take the (equilibrium) wage function
of the O-ring model:
w∗(q) = (1− α)
(
α
r
) α
1−α
(n∗)
1
1−α q
n
1−α , (14)
logarithmise, and solve for nlog(q):
n∗log(q) = (1− α)log(w∗(q))− (1− α)log(1− α)− αlog
(
α
r
)
− log(n∗). (15)
Inserting this expression into equation (13) gives after rearranging:
log(n∗) = 1− (1− α)log(1− α)− αlog
(
α
r
)
+ (1− α)log(w∗(q)). (16)
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This equation can be estimated by regressing the log of the number of employees
on the log of wages treating 1 − (1 − α)log(1 − α) − αlog(α/r) as regression
constant. The O-ring theory predicts that the regression coefficient of log(w∗(q))
lies in the interval (0,1) since (1 − α) is the value share for labour. This can be
seen if equation (14) is multiplied by n∗:
n∗w∗(q) = (1− α)(k∗)α(n∗)1−αqn∗n∗ = (1− α)Y. (17)
Table 3 shows the results of this regression. The upper part gives the regression
coefficient while not differentiating between industries, whereas the lower part
shows the coefficient for each sector. With the exception of the coefficients in
medium-high technology and knowledge-intensive high-tech services – which are
both not significantly different from zero – all coefficients are negative and sig-
nificantly different from zero in most cases. More able individuals tend to found
smaller firms instead of larger firms (e.g. in low-technology a 1% higher (geo-
metric) average wage leads to a 0.307% lower employment). This holds for firms
founded with university graduates as well as for firms founded without univer-
sity graduates. Thus, the estimated coefficients do not represent value shares for
labour and H3 can be rejected. A possible explanation is that more able persons
are in a better position to adopt several tasks so that it is not necessary to resort
to the knowledge of other persons. Interestingly, this result is not only contrasts
with the predictions of the O-ring theory but also with the existing evidence on
the relationship between wages and firm size. Apparently, the positive relation-
ship between these two variables, as found for large and established firms, does
not hold for new firms. Future research will be devoted at finding explanations
for this observation.
5.4 Relationship between ability and capital per head
A similar procedure as in the case of the relationship between ability and team
size can be applied for the test of H4, which states that ability and capital per
head are positively related. Remember that the equation for capital employment
per head in equilibrium is:
k∗
n∗
=
(
αqn
∗
r
) 1
1−α
(n∗)
1
1−α (18)
20
Table 3: Relationship between ability and team size
all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
dep. var.: log(employment) coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
average log(wages) -0.081*** 0.009 -0.070*** 0.023 -0.068*** 0.009
average log(wages) in . . .
low-technology -0.307*** 0.087 -0.136 0.160 -0.236*** 0.080
medium-low technology -0.137 0.102 -0.674 1.154 -0.185** 0.092
medium-high technology 0.056 0.097 0.466 0.297 0.003 0.106
high-technology -0.390 0.267 -2.590* 1.444 -0.263 0.185
construction work -0.136*** 0.037 -0.430* 0.232 -0.117*** 0.036
wholesale trade -0.031 0.021 0.026 0.057 -0.032 0.020
retail trade, repair -0.054*** 0.018 -0.063 0.051 -0.058*** 0.019
hotels, restaurants -0.393*** 0.072 -0.315 0.337 -0.314*** 0.067
freight transport -0.057** 0.028 -0.373 0.540 -0.003 0.018
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.056 0.002 0.009
knowl.-intens. market serv. -0.043*** 0.013 -0.058** 0.024 -0.029*** 0.012
other knowl.-intens. serv. -0.003 0.019 -0.007 0.039 -0.001 0.021
constant 1.371*** 0.340 0.686 0.628 1.067*** 0.318
industry dummies YES YES YES
R2 0.065 0.097 0.058
number of observations 13,467 2,481 10,815
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
Taking logs and inserting equation (15) for nlog(q) yields after some rearrange-
ments:
log
(
k∗
n∗
)
= log
(
α
r(1− α)
)
+ log(w∗(q)). (19)
According to the theory the coefficient of log(w(q)) has to be one. Estimating
equation (19) by regressing the balance sum per head on average wages on the firm
level, treating log
(
α
r(1−α)
)
as regression constant, gives the results shown in Table
4. Note, that the t-test performed on the coefficients has the null hypothesis that
the respective coefficient equals one. Overall, the hypothesis that the estimated
coefficient is one is rejected as can be seen from the upper part of the Table.
However, in half of the sectors the rejection is not possible at the 5% level.
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Table 4: Relationship between ability and capital employment per head
all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
dep. var.: log(balance sum per head) coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
average log(wages) 0.444*** 0.043 0.767** 0.104 0.379*** 0.048
average log(wages) in . . .
low-technology 0.610 0.275 0.393 0.616 0.764 0.299
medium-low technology 0.776 0.322 -0.416 0.990 0.803 0.332
medium-high technology 0.729 0.617 5.620* 2.643 0.710 0.628
high-technology -0.402*** 0.545 -1.607** 1.114 -0.192* 0.628
construction work 0.133*** 0.124 0.621 0.696 0.106*** 0.127
wholesale trade 0.177*** 0.137 0.532* 0.252 0.135*** 0.151
retail trade, repair -0.061*** 0.102 -0.031*** 0.277 -0.074*** 0.110
hotels, restaurants 0.190*** 0.116 0.295 0.480 0.193*** 0.125
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 1.100 0.139 1.274 0.319 1.062 0.155
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.832* 0.087 0.980 0.146 0.724*** 0.108
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.881 0.344 0.993 0.574 0.805 0.390
freight transport 0.427*** 0.135 -0.650* 0.901 0.446*** 0.139
constant 7.753*** 1.021 8.326*** 2.269 7.190*** 1.112
industry dummies YES YES YES
R2 0.066 0.110 0.064
number of observations 11,052 1,960 8,929
Notes: ***, * depict whether the respective coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 1% and 10% level
respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
This is the case in low-, medium-low, medium-high technology, and in the knowledge-
intensive services.17 Thus, there is some evidence that the relationship between
ability and capital input per head is predicted correctly by the O-ring theory.
17The relationship appears to be more pronounced for firms with university graduates than
for firms without university graduates. For firms with university graduates, in 10 out of 12
sectors the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to one cannot be rejected at the
5% level, compared to 6 out of 12 sectors for firms without university graduates. However, this
result is mainly due to larger standard deviations because of fewer observations.
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5.5 Discussion
Up to now the results are mixed concerning the O-ring theory providing an ap-
propriate description for the situation of young firms. Individuals tend to choose
partners with the same instead of different educational background and higher
able individuals found smaller instead of larger firms. At the same time, there is
some evidence that individuals match according to their level of ability and that
the average ability level is positively correlated to capital input per head.
One reason for these inconclusive results might be that the variables and measures
are not defined appropriately. Concerning the Herfindahl-Index, the aggregation
of disciplines as well as the decision whether to use the transformed or untrans-
formed index is arbitrary. Therefore, I also conducted the analysis with the
untransformed Herfindahl-Index and a different level of aggregation. Basically,
the results remained the same. Only level effects were detectable.
Concerns might also be raised with respect to the construction of the ability
measure. The approach in this paper is to use wages corrected for all factors that
do not represent ability components. It can be argued, however, that disciplines
and industries also contain ability aspects, for example due to selectivity: High
ability persons might pick high wage industries and disciplines which are highly
rewarded. However, the fraction of demand effects in these factors is probably
higher than the fraction of ability effects, so that the former are corrected for
here.
The situation is different for other factors whose effect could be corrected for,
such as gender, having children or place of residence (rural area or city). For
each of these factors it is possible to find reasons why they represent aspects
of ability. For example: Women may be equally intelligent as men, but might
lack bargaining strength and assertiveness, which results in lower wages. But
bargaining strength and assertiveness are aspects of ability that are useful and
important when establishing a new firm. Concerning the place of residence, high
ability individuals might tend to live in cities because employers demanding able
persons tend to have their offices and production halls there.
My procedure of correcting wages differs in two respects from the one used by
Iranzo et al. (2008). First, Iranzo et al. (2008) only take the pure person effect
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net of observable characteristics as ability. In contrast, in my analysis also ob-
servable characteristics like level of education, labour market experience, or age
are regarded as determinants of ability and therefore not corrected for. Second,
unobservable firm effects are not excluded from the wages because the O-ring
effect is a firm effect: Successful firms might be successful just because they em-
ploy good workers which in turn is then again reflected in the wages. Ultimately,
the correction of wages is also arbitrary to some degree. To check whether the
results depend on the correction of wages I also performed the analysis with raw
wages (only corrected for inflation) and with wages corrected for gender, children
and place of residence in addition to disciplines and industries. Again, there were
only level effects detectable. Qualitatively the results remained the same.
The final remark concerns the considered time span for calculating the average
lifetime wage. Running from the year of labour market entry until 2001, the
considered time span also covers the period an individual is involved in a new
firm. This is done since no wage information is available for the time before
1998 for a considerable fraction of individuals, resulting in the impossibility to
determine the degree of homogeneity for a considerable number of firms. In
order to test whether this procedure has an impact on the results, I restricted
the sample to firms for which wage information of their employees is available for
the time before 1998. Again, the results were not affected qualitatively. Thus,
the construction of the variable does not seem to influence the results.
A second explanation for the inconclusive results in Sections 5.1 to 5.4 is that
the hypotheses derived in Section 2 are based on equations which describe the
situation in equilibrium. Regarding reality however, it can be assumed that
adaption processes are necessary to reach an equilibrium, and individuals first
have to figure out what the optimal behaviour is. This line of argumentation is
pursuit in the next Section.
5.6 Development over time
If the O-ring theory provides reasonable explanations it can be expected that the
observed facts approach the predicted facts over time even when the observed
facts do not correspond very well with the predicted facts in the start-up year.
In detail, the following developments are expected to be observed:
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- The diversity of disciplines goes up (the Herfindahl-Index of the highest
educational attainment goes down).
- The degree of homogeneity with respect to ability goes up (the standard
deviation of log(wages) goes down).18
- The correlation between ability and team size becomes positive.
For the following analysis the situations before and after new individuals (here-
after called: newcomers) join the firm are compared. The considered time span
is 1998 to 2001. Since there is no obvious reason that the actual point of entry
time is relevant, all firms are treated as a pooled sample and the cases (firms and
years) where newcomers joined the firm are selected.19
Figure 2 shows the fraction of firms which get newcomers in the period 1999
to 2001. In total, 20 percent of all firms have newcomers whereby the fraction
of firms which take on new persons is significantly higher among firms without
university graduates than among firms with university graduates (20 percent
compared to 16 percent). What can also be observed is that the ranking of the
sectors concerning the fraction of firms with new team members is similar to
that concerning the fraction of firms founded with more than one person. The
sector hotels, restaurants ranks first followed by the manufacturing sectors. The
knowledge-intensive service sectors are again on the lower end.20 The only sector
in which firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without
university graduates is knowledge-intensive high-tech services. In this sector the
fraction of firms with university graduates hiring newcomers is significantly higher
than the fraction of firms without university graduates.
18The development of homogeneity with respect to ability is included since for many cases,
especially for firms with university graduates, it cannot be excluded that the matching occurs
completely randomly.
19For example, if a firm takes on a newcomer in 1999 then the situation in 1998 is stored in
the variable X before and the situation in 1999 is stored in the variable X after. If a firm gets
a newcomer in 2000 the situation in 1999 is the situation which is considered for the “before-
variable and the situation in 2000 is collected in the “aftervariable. If a firm gets newcomers
both in 1999 and 2000 the situation in 1999 is considered once as the “aftersituation (with
respect to 1998) and once as the “beforesituation (with respect to 2000).
20A simple probit estimation also reveals that firms founded by teams are more likely to get
newcomers than single entrepreneurs.
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Figure 2: Fraction of firms with newcomers in the period 1999 to 2001
fraction of firms with joiners in either year
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medium-high
technology
high technology
medium-low
technology
construction work
hotels, restaurants
fraction of firms in percent
all firms
firms with university graduates
firms w/o university graduates
Reading aid: 33.33 percent of the firms founded without university graduates in high technology take on new
persons in the period 1999 to 2001.
Notes: Total number of firms: 14,171. Number of firms with university graduates: 2,543. Number of firms
without university graduates: 11,095.
A * at the sector names indicates whether firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without
university graduates at the 5% level.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
5.6.1 Heterogeneity of qualifications
As shown in Section 5.1, individuals match in a way that they choose partners
with an educational background from the same field leading to rejection of H1.
Does this also hold for the recruitment of new employees? Or do newcomers tend
to add to the existing skill stock by providing skills which are not yet existent in
the firm? To analyse this question the difference between the Herfindahl before
and after newcomers join the firm is calculated and compared with the same kind
of difference but under random assignment of newcomers to firms. As before, a
test is constructed to determine whether the outcomes of these two situations
differ significantly. In this case the null hypothesis is:
H1adev0 : The development of the actual observed composition of teams with respect
to educations equals a random process.
The difference between the value of the Herfindahl-Index before and after new-
comers join the firm in case individuals are randomly assigned to firms serves as
test statistic (∆H trrandom, where ∆ = Herfindahl after - Herfindahl before). The
distribution of ∆H trrandom has to be simulated again, which was done by 1,000
times randomly assigning the newcomers within a sector to the firms, thereby
maintaining the number of newcomers for each firm. In each round ∆H trrandom
is calculated and averaged over firms on industry level. The resulting value is
stored. The mean values of the resulting distributions are then used as the refer-
ence values for the actual observed development of the Herfindahl-Index.
Randomly assigning newcomers to firms mirrors a situation where firms do not
at all search for individuals systematically with respect to disciplines. The other
extreme case would be that firms search systematically but focus on individuals
which are equal to themselves, i.e. duplicate themselves with respect to disci-
plines. Therefore, the actually observed difference in the Herfindahl-Index is also
contrasted to a situation in which individuals choose clones of themselves with
respect to disciplines. The null hypothesis to be tested is:
H1bdev0 : The development of the actual observed composition of teams with respect
to disciplines equals a process where old team members duplicate themselves.
The simulation of the respective test statistic ∆H trduplication is as follows: As many
individuals as newcomers entering the firm are drawn with replacement from
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the individuals already working in the firm. Then the information about the
educational attainment of the selected individuals is recorded and ∆H trduplication
is calculated. Finally, the average value of ∆H trduplication on the industry level is
stored and the loop is started again. The number of rounds amounts again to
1,000.
Table 5 shows the results. The actually observed development of the Herfindahl-
Index is reported in columns (1), (4), and (7). The development of the Herfindahl-
Index when newcomers are randomly assigned to firms is shown in columns (2),
(5), and (8) and the development of the Herfindahl-Index when individuals al-
ready in the firm duplicate themselves in columns (3), (6), and (9). The actual
observed Herfindahl-Index decreases when new persons join, which means that
the diversity of skills increases. However, the decrease in the Herfindahl-Index
would have been larger if newcomers were randomly assigned to firms. This holds
for all industries as well as for both subgroups of firms. In most cases the dis-
crepancy in the differences between the two situations is highly significant. On
the other hand, if the individuals already in the firm would clone themselves, the
diversity would decrease substantially as the inspection of the respective columns
reveals. This means that individuals actually look for other persons who enrich
their skill basis, but compared to a situation of random assignment they tend to
systematically choose newcomers with skills already in the firm. Concerning H1,
the rejection is therefore maintained.
5.6.2 Degree of homogeneity with respect to ability
Concerning the degree of homogeneity with respect to ability the conclusion in
Section 5.2 was that individuals form teams with members of similar ability
level. However, the question remained whether they do it systematically, i.e.
not randomly, since in many cases the actually observed composition of teams
does not differ significantly from the composition of teams when individuals are
matched randomly, especially for firms with university graduates. To further
analyse this question, the same setup as in the previous section is used and the
actual development of the standard deviation of log wages due to newcomers is
compared to the development when newcomers are randomly assigned to firms
as well as when the existing workforce clones itself. The null hypotheses for the
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respective tests are:
H2adev0 : The development of the actually observed composition of teams with
respect to ability equals a random process.
and
H2bdev0 : The development of the actually observed composition of teams with re-
spect to disciplines equals a process where old team members duplicate themselves.
The test statistics are ∆std.dev.random in the case of random assignment of new-
comers and ∆std.dev.duplication in the case of random duplication, where ∆ =
std. dev.(log wages) after - std. dev.(log wages) before. The simulations follow
the same procedure as described in the previous Section apart from calculating
∆std.dev.random and ∆std.dev.duplication instead of ∆H
tr
random and ∆H
tr
duplication.
The results are shown in Table 6. Interestingly, the actually observed standard
deviation of log wages increases when newcomers are engaged (columns (1), (4),
and (7)). This means that, contrary to the expectations based on the O-ring
theory, the degree of homogeneity with respect to ability decreases through new
team members. However, the actual decrease in homogeneity is in many cases
not as strong as under random assignment of newcomers to firms (columns (2),
(5), and (8)). However, also here, some insignificant differences between the two
situations appear among firms with university graduates. If the old workforce had
cloned itself, the homogeneity would have increased as can be seen in columns
(3), (6), and (9). In summary, individuals choose partners systematically but do
not look for partners with similar ability levels. H2 can therefore be rejected.
The firms with university graduates in high-technology represent The only ex-
ception of the overall pattern. In these firms the homogeneity with respect to
ability increases and the increase is even stronger than under duplication. This
might be an indication that the O-ring theory applies best to this subset of firms
in this sector. However, the sector high-technology is the one with the smallest
number of firms.
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Table 7: Relationship between ability and team size
dep. var.: log(employment) coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
1999 2000 2001
average log(wages) in . . .
low-technology -0.544*** 0.126 -0.628*** 0.154 -0.665*** 0.178
medium-low technology -0.249* 0.135 -0.547*** 0.164 -0.503*** 0.162
medium-high technology -0.159 0.176 -0.544*** 0.209 -0.847*** 0.278
high-technology -0.236 0.305 0.038 0.430 -0.149 0.317
construction work -0.299*** 0.055 -0.523*** 0.072 -0.634*** 0.082
wholesale trade -0.106*** 0.034 -0.244*** 0.049 -0.308*** 0.054
retail trade, repair -0.182*** 0.031 -0.297*** 0.045 -0.383*** 0.053
hotels, restaurants -0.580*** 0.105 -0.757*** 0.134 -0.964*** 0.157
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. -0.124*** 0.024 -0.168*** 0.041 -0.164*** 0.044
knowl.-intens. market serv. -0.126*** 0.023 -0.163*** 0.028 -0.210*** 0.034
other knowl.-intens. serv. -0.091** 0.038 -0.035 0.055 -0.095* 0.056
freight transport -0.113*** 0.043 -0.186*** 0.058 -0.205*** 0.069
constant 2.351*** 0.494 2.740*** 0.602 2.897*** 0.694
industry dummies YES YES YES
R2 0.072 0.081 0.092
number of observations 11,322 8,650 7,028
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Source: Statistics Denmark, own calculations.
5.6.3 Relationship between ability and team size
In Section 5.3 it was shown that, from the perspective of the O-ring theory,
the “wrongffirms, i.e. firms with a lower average ability level, employ a higher
number of individuals. However, a reason be, as argued, that individuals first
have to figure out the optimal team size. If this is the case, we should observe
that the correlation becomes positive over time. However, as Table 7 shows this
does not happen. The numbers display the estimated coefficients of equation (16)
separately for the years 1999 to 2001. Over the whole timespan the relationship
between average ability and firm size remains negative. This holds for almost
all industries as well as for firms with university graduates and firms without
university graduates (not shown). The negative relationship between ability and
team size is obviously stable.
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6 Conclusion
At first sight it seems compelling to assume that new firms have a team com-
posed of specialists what requires to rely on sufficient task performance of each
team member. The O-ring theory then seems to provide an obvious theoretical
basis, from which hypotheses regarding the characteristics of new firms can be
derived. However, as the results in this paper show the O-ring theory does not
provide a good description of the situation of young firms. Using a rich employer-
employee data set covering all firms established in 1998 in Denmark, the following
is discovered:
- Only about one tenth of all firms founded in 1998 are set up with more
than one person. Manufacturing firms are more likely to be founded by
a team than service sector firms. Over the whole period considered, the
average number of employees amounts to 1.7, whereby firms with university
graduates are larger than firms without university graduates. Thus, for the
majority of firms the risk of matching is not relevant.
- If firms are founded by a team, the matching occurs systematically with
respect to the degree of educational attainment such that individuals with
the same educations team up. Thus, teams are not composed of specialists
in different areas.
- Matching also occurs systematically with respect to ability but individuals
do not choose partners with the same level of ability, as predicted by the
O-ring theory.
- Also contrary to the predictions of the O-ring theory, the average level of
ability in firms is negatively correlated with firm size.
- The average ability on the firm level is positively correlated with capital
input per head. This is the only result that is in line with the predictions
of the O-ring theory.
The question left open by the analysis of this paper is whether individuals sys-
tematically commit errors by assembling the human capital basis of their firms,
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e.g. that individuals do not behave in line with the O-ring theory although it
would be good for them. If this is the case, there would be a strong argument in
favour of fostering ability matching, e.g. through incubators, on the policy side.
To determine whether there are reasons for such a policy intervention an analysis
determining the performance consequences of the team composition needs to be
conducted. This will be done in an additional paper.
If it turns out that also there is no reason to stick to the O-ring theory from the
normative perspective either, a submodular function instead of a supermodular
function like the O-ring production function might be considered as alternative.
As Grossman and Maggi (2000) argue, for many creative or problem solving
tasks it suffices that only one person comes up with a new idea or a solution for a
problem. Having several high-ability individuals employed is therefore a waste of
resources. Submodular functions imply matching of high-ability individuals with
low-ability individuals. This would correspond betterwith the decrease in the
degree of homogeneity with respect to ability over time observed in the Danish
data.
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Appendix
Table 8: Definition of industries
NACE - Code Description
Low-technology 15, 16 Food, beverages and tobacco
17, 18, 19 Textile and clothing
20, 21, 22 Wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publish-
ing
36, 37 Other manufacturing and recycling
Medium-low technology 23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
351 Shipbuilding
Medium-high technology 24, excl. 24.4 Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals
29 Non-electrical machinery
31 Electric machinery
34 Motor vehicles
352, 354, 355 Other transport equipment
High-technology 244 Pharmaceuticals
30 Computers, office machinery
32 Electronics, communication
33 Scientific instruments
353 Aerospace
Knowledge-intensive 64 Post and telecommunications
high-tech services 72 Computer and related activities
73 Research and development
Knowledge-intensive 61 Water transport
market services (excl. 62 Air transport
financial inter- 70 Real estate activities
mediation) 71 Renting of machinery and equipment w/o opera-
tor, and of personal and household goods
74 Other business activities
Other knowledge- 80 Education
intensive services 85 Health and social work
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
Source: OECD (2003).
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Figure 3: Average number of employees during the period 1998 to 2001
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Reading aid: Firms in the knowledge-intensive market services have on average of 1.50 individuals during the
period 1998 to 2001.
A * at the sector names indicates whether firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without
university graduates at the 5% level.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
Table 9: Heterogeneity of educations in start-up year – 95% confidence intervals (CI)
industry all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
observed
value
95%-CI
under
random
assignm.
observed
value
95%-CI
under
random
assignm.
observed
value
95% CI-
under
random
assignm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total (firms with n > 1) 0.131*** [0.042; 0.057] 0.084*** [0.018; 0.030] 0.145*** [0.048; 0.066]
manufacturing
low-technology 0.143*** [0.045; 0.121] 0.103** [0.028; 0.091] 0.164*** [0.045; 0.134]
medium-low technology 0.088* [0.020; 0.092] 0.065* [0.011; 0.071] 0.092 [0.017; 0.106]
medium-high technology 0.086 [0.003; 0.111] 0.033 [0.000; 0.100] 0.098 [0.000; 0.145]
high technology 0.099 [0.012; 0.195] 0.063 [0.012; 0.102] 0.148 [0.000; 0.300]
construction work 0.223*** [0.044; 0.081] 0.199*** [0.013; 0.056] 0.228*** [0.045; 0.087]
services
wholesale trade 0.125*** [0.014; 0.055] 0.027 [0.004; 0.038] 0.150*** [0.015; 0.068]
retail trade, repair 0.107*** [0.033; 0.067] 0.045** [0.011; 0.043] 0.116*** [0.034; 0.072]
hotels, restaurants 0.103*** [0.044; 0.078] 0.039 [0.019; 0.053] 0.110*** [0.046; 0.085]
freight transport 0.082** [0.022; 0.078] 0.044 [0.009; 0.052] 0.090** [0.021; 0.087]
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.112*** [0.008; 0.068] 0.068*** [0.003; 0.043] 0.169** [0.000; 0.167]
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.128*** [0.014; 0.049] 0.120*** [0.010; 0.032] 0.137*** [0.010; 0.098]
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.033 [0.000; 0.089] 0.000 [0.000; 0.067] 0.050 [0.000; 0.126]
Notes: The diversity of educations is measured by the Herfindahl-Index of highest educational attainment. Columns
(1), (3), and (5) show the average Herfindahl-Index by industry, based on the actual sorting of individuals to firms.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) depict the mean value of the distribution of the average Herfindahl-Index by industry,
generated with random assignment of individuals to firms.
***, **, * indicate whether the values in column (1), (3), and (5) are significantly different from the values in column
(2), (4), and (6) at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
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Table 10: Homogeneity of abilities in start-up year – 95% confidence intervals (CI)
industry all firms firms with firms w/o
univ. graduates univ.graduates
observed
value
95%-CI
under
random
assignm.
observed
value
95%-CI
under
random
assignm.
observed
value
95% CI-
under
random
assignm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total (firms with n > 1) 0.276*** [0.301; 0.314] 0.300** [0.301; 0.329] 0.266*** [0.297; 0.314]
manufacturing
low-technology 0.292* [0.291; 0.345] 0.260*** [0.279; 0.389] 0.304 [0.281; 0.350]
medium-low technology 0.261** [0.272; 0.341] 0.284 [0.247; 0.397] 0.255* [0.254; 0.349]
medium-high technology 0.236** [0.247; 0.347] 0.260 [0.184; 0.401] 0.230* [0.218; 0.384]
high technology 0.438 [0.309; 0.601] 0.534 [0.267; 0.656] 0.309 [0.209; 0.734]
construction work 0.236*** [0.265; 0.291] 0.253 [0.233; 0.319] 0.232*** [0.264; 0.292]
services
wholesale trade 0.319 [0.297; 0.344] 0.340 [0.274; 0.371] 0.312 [0.290; 0.352]
retail trade, repair 0.262*** [0.277; 0.304] 0.275 [0.249; 0.341] 0.258*** [0.274; 0.306]
hotels, restaurants 0.291*** [0.313; 0.343] 0.338 [0.290; 0.377] 0.279*** [0.310; 0.345]
freight transport 0.291*** [0.313; 0.372] 0.343 [0.290; 0.436] 0.264*** [0.304; 0.376]
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.283 [0.270; 0.331] 0.279 [0.256; 0.332] 0.287 [0.231; 0.401]
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.288*** [0.299; 0.338] 0.292** [0.297; 0.347] 0.283 [0.266; 0.359]
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.305 [0.271; 0.398] 0.351 [0.231; 0.453] 0.282 [0.244; 0.418]
Notes: Ability is measured by the average lifetime wage (in logs) of an individual corrected for inflation, disciplines
and industry. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the average standard deviation of ability by industry, based on the
actual sorting of individuals to firms. Columns (2), (4), and (6) depict the mean value of the distribution of the
average standard deviation by industry, generated with random assignment of individuals to firms.
***, **, * indicate whether the values in column (1), (3), and (5) are significantly different from the values in column
(2), (4), and (6) at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Source: Statistics Denmark, own calculations.
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